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Abstract—Web developers routinely rely on third-party Java-
Script libraries such as jQuery to enhance the functionality of
their sites. However, if not properly maintained, such dependen-
cies can create attack vectors allowing a site to be compromised.
In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive study of
client-side JavaScript library usage and the resulting security
implications across the Web. Using data from over 133 k websites,
we show that 37 % of them include at least one library with a
known vulnerability; the time lag behind the newest release of
a library is measured in the order of years. In order to better
understand why websites use so many vulnerable or outdated
libraries, we track causal inclusion relationships and quantify
different scenarios. We observe sites including libraries in ad hoc
and often transitive ways, which can lead to different versions of
the same library being loaded into the same document at the same
time. Furthermore, we find that libraries included transitively, or
via ad and tracking code, are more likely to be vulnerable. This
demonstrates that not only website administrators, but also the
dynamic architecture and developers of third-party services are
to blame for the Web’s poor state of library management.
The results of our work underline the need for more thorough
approaches to dependency management, code maintenance and
third-party code inclusion on the Web.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Web is arguably the most popular contemporary
programming platform. Although websites are relatively easy to
create, they are often composed of heterogeneous components
such as database backends, content generation engines, multiple
scripting languages and client-side code, and they need to deal
with unsanitised inputs encoded in several different formats.
Hence, it is no surprise that it is challenging to secure websites
because of the large attack surface they expose.
One specific, significant attack surface are vulnerabilities
related to client-side JavaScript, such as cross-site scripting
(XSS) and advanced phishing. Crucially, modern websites often
include popular third-party JavaScript libraries, and thus are at
risk of inheriting vulnerabilities contained in these libraries. For
example, a 2013 XSS vulnerability in the jQuery [13] library
before version 1.6.3 allowed remote attackers to inject arbitrary
scripts or HTML into vulnerable websites via a crafted tag. As
a result, it is of the utmost importance for websites to manage
library dependencies and, in particular, to update vulnerable
libraries in a timely fashion.
To date, security research has addressed a wide range of
client-side security issues in websites, including validation [30]
and XSS ([17], [36]), cross-site request forgery [4], and session
fixation [34]. However, the use of vulnerable JavaScript libraries
by websites has not received nearly as much attention. In
2014, a series of blog posts presented cursory measurements
highlighting that major websites included known vulnerable
libraries ([25], [26], [24]). These findings echo warnings from
other software ecosystems like Android [3], Java [32] and
Windows [21], which show that vulnerable libraries continue
to exist in the wild even when they are widely known to
contain severe vulnerabilities. Given that JavaScript dependency
management is relatively primitive and corresponding tools
are not as well-established as in more mature ecosystems,
these findings suggest that security issues caused by outdated
JavaScript libraries on the Web may be widespread.
In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive study on
the security implications of JavaScript library usage in websites.
We seek to answer the following questions:
• Where do websites load JavaScript libraries from (i.e.,
first or third-party domains), and how frequently are
these domains used?
• How current are the libraries that websites are using,
and do they contain known vulnerabilities?
• Are web developers intentionally including JavaScript
libraries, or are these dependencies caused by adver-
tising and tracking code?
• Are existing remediation strategies effective or widely
used?
• Are there additional technical, methodological, or
organisational changes that can improve the security
of websites with respect to JavaScript library usage?
Note that the focus of this paper is not measuring the security
state of specific JavaScript libraries. Rather, our goal (and
primary contribution) is to empirically examine whether website
operators keep their libraries current and react to publicly
disclosed vulnerabilities.
Answering these questions necessitated solving three funda-
mental methodological challenges. First, there is no centralised
repository of metadata pertaining to JavaScript libraries and
their versions, release dates, and known vulnerabilities. To
address this, we manually constructed a catalogue containing
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all “release” versions of 72 of the most popular open-source
libraries, including detailed vulnerability information on a
subset of 11 libraries. Second, web developers often modify
JavaScript libraries by reformatting, restructuring or appending
code, which makes it difficult to detect library usage in the
wild. We solve this problem through a combination of static
and dynamic analysis techniques. Third, to understand why
specific libraries are loaded by a given site, we need to track all
of the causal relationships between page elements (e.g., script
s1 in frame f1 injects script s2 into frame f2). To solve this,
we developed a customised version of Chromium that records
detailed causality trees of page element creation relationships.
Using these tools, we crawled the Alexa Top 75 k websites
and a random sample of 75 k websites drawn from a snapshot
of the .com zone in May 2016. These two crawls allow us to
compare and contrast JavaScript library usage between popular
and unpopular websites. In total, we observed 11,141,726 inline
scripts and script file inclusions; 86.6 % of Alexa sites and
65.4 % of .com sites used at least one well-known JavaScript
library, with jQuery being the most popular by a large majority.
Analysis of our dataset reveals many concerning facts
about JavaScript library management on today’s Web. More
than a third of the websites in our Alexa crawl include at
least one vulnerable library version, and nearly 10 % include
two or more different vulnerable versions. From a per-library
perspective, at least 36.7 % of jQuery, 40.1 % of Angular, 86.6 %
of Handlebars, and 87.3 % of YUI inclusions use a vulnerable
version. Alarmingly, many sites continue to rely on libraries
like YUI and SWFObject that are no longer maintained. In fact,
the median website in our dataset is using a library version
1,177 days older than the newest release, which explains why so
many vulnerable libraries tend to linger on the Web. Advertising,
tracking and social widget code can cause transitive library
inclusions with a higher rate of vulnerability, suggesting that
these problems extend beyond individual website administrators
to providers of Web infrastructure and services.
We also observe many websites exhibiting surprising
behaviours with respect to JavaScript library inclusion. For
example, 4.2 % of websites using jQuery in the Alexa crawl
include the same library version multiple times in the same
document, and 10.9 % include multiple different versions of
jQuery into the same document. To our knowledge, ours
is the first study to make these observations, since existing
tools ([27], [20]) are unable to detect these anomalies. These
strange behaviours may have a negative impact on security as
asynchronous loading leads to nondeterministic behaviour, and
it remains unclear which version will ultimately be used.
Perhaps our most sobering finding is practical evidence that
the JavaScript library ecosystem is complex, unorganised, and
quite “ad hoc” with respect to security. As of this writing, there
are no reliable vulnerability databases, no security mailing lists
for the most popular libraries, few or no details on security
issues in release notes, and often, it is difficult to identify which
versions of a library are affected by a reported vulnerability.
Overall, our study makes the following contributions:
• We conduct the first comprehensive study showing that
a significant number of websites include vulnerable or
outdated JavaScript libraries.
• We present results on the origins of vulnerable
JavaScript library inclusions, which allows us to
contrast the security posture of website developers with
third-party modules such as WordPress, advertising or
tracking networks, and social media widgets.
• We show that a large number of websites include
JavaScript libraries in unexpected ways, such as mul-
tiple inclusions of different library versions into the
same document, which may impact their attack surface.
• We find existing remediation strategies to be ineffective
at mitigating the threats posed by vulnerable JavaScript
libraries. For example, less than 3 % of websites could
fix all their vulnerable libraries by applying only patch-
level updates. Similarly, only 2 % of websites use the
version-aliasing services offered by JavaScript CDNs.
II. BACKGROUND
JavaScript has allowed web developers to build highly inter-
active websites with sophisticated functionality. For example,
communication and production-related online services such as
Gmail and Office 365 make heavy use of JavaScript to create
web-based applications comparable to their more traditional
desktop counterparts. In this paper, we focus exclusively on
aspects of client-side JavaScript executed in a browser, not the
recent trend of using JavaScript for server-side programming.
A. JavaScript Libraries
In many cases, to make their lives easier, web developers
rely on functionality that is bundled in libraries. For example,
jQuery [13] is a popular JavaScript library that makes HTML
document traversal and manipulation, event handling, animation,
and AJAX much simpler and compatible across browsers.
In the simplest case, a JavaScript library is a plain-text script
containing code with reasonably well-defined functionality. The
script has full access to the DOM that includes it; the concept of
namespaces does not exist in JavaScript, and everything that is
created is by default global. More elaborate libraries use hacks
and conventions to protect the code against naming conflicts,
and expose interfaces for retrieving meta-data such as the name
and version of the library. Over the course of this study, we
found that JavaScript libraries overwhelmingly use the Semantic
Versioning [28] convention of major.minor.patch, such
as 1.0.1, where the major version component is increased for
breaking changes, the minor component for new functionality,
and the patch component for backwards-compatible bug fixes.
To include a library into their website, developers typically
use the <script src="url"></script> HTML tag and
point to an externally-hosted version of the library or a copy
on their own server. Library vendors often provide a minified
version that has comments and whitespace removed and local
variables shortened to reduce the size of the file. Developers
can also concatenate multiple libraries into a single file, create
custom builds of libraries, or use advanced minification features
such as dead code removal. While custom minification builds
are relatively common, more aggressive minification settings are
rare in client-side JavaScript because they can break code [9].
CDNs. Many libraries are available on Content Distribution
Networks (CDNs) for use by other websites. Google, Microsoft
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and Yandex host libraries on their CDNs, some popular libraries
(e.g., Bootstrap and jQuery) offer their own CDNs, and some
community-based CDNs accept to host arbitrary open-source
libraries. JavaScript CDNs enable caching of libraries across
websites to increase performance. Another useful feature offered
by some CDNs is version aliasing. That is, when including a
library, the developer may specify a version prefix instead of the
full version string, in which case the CDN returns the newest
available version with that prefix. When implemented correctly,
the patched version of a library will automatically be used on the
website when it becomes available on the CDN. However, this
works only for security issues fixed in a backwards-compatible
manner, and it conflicts with client-side security mechanisms
such as subresource integrity [37]. In addition, version aliasing
makes client-side caching of resources less efficient because it
must be configured for shorter time spans, that is, hours instead
of years. As a result, version aliasing is often discouraged [11].
Third Parties. Third-party modules such as advertising,
trackers, social media or other widgets that are often embedded
in webpages typically implemented in JavaScript. Furthermore,
these scripts can also load libraries, possibly without the
knowledge of the site maintainer. If not isolated in a frame,
these libraries gain full privileges in the including site’s context.
Thus, even if a web developer keeps own library dependencies
updated, outdated versions may still be included by badly
maintained third-party content. Also, some JavaScript libraries
and many web frameworks contain their own copies of libraries
they depend on. Hence, web developers may unknowingly rely
on software maintainers to update JavaScript libraries.
B. Vulnerabilities in JavaScript Libraries
While JavaScript is the de-facto standard for developing
client-side code on the Web, at the same time it is notorious
for security vulnerabilities. A common, lingering problem is
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [17], which allows an attacker to
inject malicious code (or HTML) into a website. In particular,
if a JavaScript library accepts input from the user and does
not validate it, an XSS vulnerability might creep in, and all
websites using this library could become vulnerable.
As an example, consider the popular jQuery library and its
$() function, which is overloaded and has different behaviour
depending on which type of argument is passed [15]: If a string
containing a CSS selector is passed, the function searches the
DOM tree for corresponding elements and returns references to
them; if the input string contains HTML, the function creates
the corresponding elements and returns the references. As a
consequence, developers who pass improperly sanitised input
to this function may inadvertently allow attackers to inject
code even though the developers’ original intent was only
to select an existing element. While this API design places
convenience over security considerations and the implications
could be better highlighted in the documentation, it does not
automatically constitute a vulnerability in the library.
In older versions of jQuery, however, the $() function’s le-
niency in parsing string parameters could lead to complications
by misleading developers to believe, for instance, that any string
beginning with # would be interpreted as a selector and could be
safe to pass to the function, as #test selects the element with
identifier test. Yet, jQuery considered parameters containing a
TABLE I. THE 30 MOST FREQUENT LIBRARIES IN OUR ALEXA CRAWL
(OUT OF 72 SUPPORTED LIBRARIES). VERSIONS: s© TOTAL IN REFERENCE
CATALOGUE FOR STATIC DETECTION; d© DYNAMIC DETECTIONS OBSERVED
IN CRAWLS (SOME LIBRARIES/VERSIONS NOT SUPPORTED DYNAMICALLY).
Versions Bower Wapp Use on Crawled Sites
Library s© d© Rank % ALEXA COM
jQuery 66 64 1 42 % 83.9 % 61.1 %
jQuery-UI 46 46 13 7 % 23.5 % 8.0 %
Modernizr 24 28 18 10 % 21.4 % 8.6 %
Bootstrap 32 10 3 12.5 % 4.5 %
jQuery-Migrate 7 0 11.3 % 10.7 %
Underscore 61 34 12 3 % 5.8 % 2.4 %
SWFObject 2 1 3.7 % 2.4 %
Moment 54 33 6 3.5 % 1.4 %
RequireJS 62 40 3.4 % 2.3 %
jQuery-Form 14 0 2.7 % 3.4 %
Backbone 29 19 2 % 2.7 % 1.6 %
Angular 110 78 2 2.4 % 1.6 %
LoDash 77 57 26 2.4 % 2.5 %
jQuery-Tools 8 20 2.3 % 0.9 %
jQuery-Fancybox 10 0 2.3 % 1.4 %
GreenSock GSAP 45 45 2.2 % 2.8 %
Handlebars 25 15 2.0 % 0.4 %
Prototype 5 14 1.8 % 1.1 %
MooTools 27 24 3 % 1.5 % 1.4 %
WebFont Loader 100 0 1.5 % 0.9 %
jQuery-Cookie 8 0 21 1.4 % 0.2 %
Hammer.js 26 14 1.2 % 0.4 %
jQuery-Validation 13 0 1.1 % 0.6 %
Mustache 29 21 1.1 % 0.9 %
YUI 3 37 26 1.0 % 1.4 %
Velocity 55 15 0.9 % 0.2 %
Script.aculo.us 5 12 0.8 % 0.4 %
Knockout 21 9 0.8 % 0.1 %
Flexslider 11 0 0.6 % 0.4 %
React 41 23 28 0.5 % 1.6 %
HTML <tag> anywhere in the string as HTML [14], so that a
parameter such as #<img src=/ onerror=alert(1)>
would lead to code execution rather than a selection. This
behaviour was considered a vulnerability and fixed.
Other vulnerabilities in JavaScript libraries include cases
where libraries do not sanitise inputs that are expected to be
pure text, but are passed to eval() or document.write()
internally, which could cause them to be executed as script
or rendered as markup, respectively. Attackers can use these
capabilities to steal data from a user’s browsing session, initiate
transactions on the user’s behalf, or place fake content on a
website. Therefore, JavaScript libraries must not introduce any
attack vectors into the websites where they are used.
III. METHODOLOGY
Identifying client-side JavaScript libraries, finding out how
they are loaded by a website, and determining whether they are
outdated or vulnerable requires a combination of techniques
and data sources. Challenges arise due to the lax JavaScript
language, the fragmented library ecosystem, and the complex
nature of modern websites. First, we need to collect metadata
about popular JavaScript libraries, including a list of available
versions, the corresponding release dates, code samples, and
known vulnerabilities. Second, we must be able to determine if
JavaScript code found in the wild is a known library. Third, we
need to crawl websites while keeping track of causal resource
inclusion relationships and match them with detected libraries.
A. Catalogueing JavaScript Libraries
In contrast to Maven’s Central Repository in the Java world,
JavaScript does not have a similarly popular repository of library
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versioning and project dependency metadata. We must therefore
collect and correlate this data from various separate sources.
1) Selecting Libraries: The initial construction of our meta-
data archive involves a certain amount of manual verification
work. Since there are thousands of JavaScript libraries (e.g.,
the community-based cdnjs.com hosts 2,379 projects as of
August 2016), we focus our study on the most widely used
libraries because they are the most consequential.
To select libraries, we leverage library popularity statistics
provided by the JavaScript package manager Bower [6] and
the web technology survey Wappalyzer [38]. We extend this
list of popular libraries with all projects hosted on the public
CDNs operated by Google, Microsoft and Yandex. As we will
show in Section IV-C, many websites rely on these commercial
CDNs to host JavaScript libraries. We collected the data from
Bower, Wappalyzer, and the three CDNs in January 2016.
Due to various data availability requirements explained in
detail in Section III-A5, we need to exclude certain libraries
from our study. Overall, we support 72 libraries—18 out of the
Top 20 installed with Bower, 7 out of the Top 10 frameworks
identified on websites by Wappalyzer, 13 of the 14 libraries
hosted by Google, 12 of the 18 libraries hosted by Microsoft,
and all 11 libraries hosted by Yandex. Table I shows a subset
of 30 libraries in our catalogue as well as their rank on Bower
and their market share according to Wappalyzer. Although our
catalogue appears to cover a sparse set of the libraries on
Bower, many of the missing ranks belong to submodules of
popular libraries (e.g., rank 5 is Angular Mocks). According to
Wappalyzer, we cover 73 % of the most popular libraries.
2) Extracting Versioning Information: Our next step is
compiling a complete list of library versions along with
their release dates. After unsuccessful experiments with file
timestamps and available-since dates on the libraries’ official
websites and CDNs, we determined that GitHub was the most
reliable source for this kind of information. Nearly all of the
open source libraries in our seed lists are hosted on GitHub
and tag the source code of their releases, allowing us to extract
timestamps and version identifiers from the tags. In naming
their releases, they typically follow a major.minor.patch
version numbering scheme, which makes it straightforward to
identify tags pertaining to releases and ignore all other tags,
including “alpha,” “beta” and “release candidate” versions that
are not meant to be used in production. As shown in Table I,
popular libraries like Angular and jQuery have up to 110 and
66 distinct versions in our catalogue, respectively. However,
half of the libraries have fewer than 26 versions.
3) Obtaining Reference Files: Some methods of library
detection require us to have access to code samples for each
version of a library. We gather library code from two sources:
the official website of each library, and from CDNs. For the
official websites, we manually download all available library
versions. However, some official websites do not provide copies
of old library versions, or they only provide copies of a subset
of versions. In contrast, CDNs typically do host comprehensive
collections of old library versions in order to not break websites
that depend on older versions. We utilise the API of one such
CDN, jsDelivr, to automatically discover all available versions
of libraries on five supported CDNs. For the remaining CDNs,
we construct download link templates manually, such as https://
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Fraction of total versions
YUI 3 (37)
Mustache (29)
jQuery-UI (46)
jQuery-Mobile (16)
jQuery-Migrate (7)
jQuery (66)
Handlebars (25)
Ember (77)
Dojo (72)
Backbone (29)
Angular (110)
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Fig. 1. Fraction of library versions with i distinct known vulnerabilities
each (represented by colours), out of the total library versions in parentheses.
Angular 1.2.0 has 5 known vulnerabilities and there are 110 versions overall.
ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/{version}/jquery.min.js. In
doing so, we make sure that we download all available variants
of a library file, including the full development variant and the
minified production variant without whitespace or comments.
When comparing files downloaded from official websites
and different CDNs, we noticed that even the same version
and variant (e.g., minified) of a library may sometimes differ
between sources. We observed additional whitespace, removal
of comments, or the likely use of a different minifier or minifier
setting, especially when the library’s developers do not provide a
minified version. This observation highlights the importance of
collecting ground-truth JavaScript library samples from as many
official and semi-official sources as possible. Therefore, we use
official websites as well as dedicated CDNs (Bootstrap CDN
and jQuery CDN), commercial CDNs (Google, Microsoft, and
Yandex), and open source CDNs (jsDelivr, cdnjs and OssCDN).
In total, we collect 81,027 JavaScript files. We analyse
the sizes of the “main” files of each library in our dataset
(that is, we exclude files such as plug-ins that cannot be
used stand-alone), and find that Script.aculo.us 1.9.0 is the
smallest at 996 bytes (minified). After accounting for duplicates
and discarding files smaller than 996 bytes (to reduce the
likelihood of false positives due to shared ancillary resources
such as configuration files, localisations and plug-ins), our final
catalogue includes 19,099 distinct files.
4) Identifying Vulnerabilities: The last step towards building
our catalogue is aggregating vulnerability information for our
72 JavaScript libraries. Unfortunately, there is no centralised
database of vulnerabilities in JavaScript libraries; instead, we
manually compile vulnerability information from the Open
Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB), the National Vulnera-
bility Database (NVD), public bug trackers, GitHub comments,
blog posts, and the vulnerabilities detected by Retire.js [27].
Overall, we are able to obtain systematically documented
details of vulnerabilities for 11 of the JavaScript libraries in
our catalogue. In some cases, the documentation for a given
flaw specifies an affected range of versions, in which case we
consider all library versions within the range to be vulnerable.
In other cases, when a flaw is identified in a specific version v
of a library, we consider all versions ≤ v to be vulnerable.
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Figure 1 shows details of the 11 libraries with vulnerability
information. For each library, we show the total number of
versions in our catalogue as well as the fraction of versions
with i distinct known vulnerabilities. The worst offender is
Angular 1.2.0, which contains 5 vulnerabilities. Overall, we
see that 28.3 %, 6.7 %, and 6.1 % of these library versions
contain one, two, or three known vulnerabilities, respectively.
5) Limitations: Although we have expended a great deal of
effort constructing our catalogue of JavaScript libraries, it is
impacted by several limitations. First, by choosing GitHub for
versioning and release date information, we need to exclude a
small number of libraries that have few or no releases tagged on
GitHub or do so in an apparently inconsistent way (e.g., multiple
successive releases tagged on the same day). Furthermore, we
cannot include closed-source libraries such as Google Maps,
advertising and tracking libraries like Google Analytics, and
social widgets since they typically do not publish version
information. Fortunately, the vast majority of such libraries are
hosted by their creators at a single, non-versioned URL (e.g.,
https://www.google-analytics.com/analytics.js), meaning that
all clients automatically include the latest version of the library.
Second, our catalogue may miss some revisions of libraries
if the author chose to patch the code and not increment the
version number. Similarly, we may miss revisions if they are
denoted using non-standard notation, such as special suffixes,
four-part version numbers, etc., and we may not possess
any code samples for a version of a library if it cannot be
downloaded from the developer website or a supported CDN.
Third, our library vulnerability assessments are based solely
on publicly available documentation. We make no attempts to
discover new vulnerabilities, or to quantify the exploitability
of libraries as used on websites, for both practical and ethical
reasons. Thus, although a website may include a vulnerable
library, this does not necessarily imply that the website is
exploitable. Furthermore, libraries differ in their release cycles,
attack surfaces, functionality, and public scrutiny with respect
to vulnerabilities. Thus, we do not claim to provide comparable
coverage of vulnerabilities for each library in our catalogue.
B. Library Identification
Identifying an unknown file as a specific version of a
JavaScript library is challenging because these libraries are text,
which gives web developers, development tools and network
software the ability to modify them, e.g., by adding or removing
features, concatenating multiple libraries into a single file, or
tampering with comments. To reliably detect as many libraries
as possible, we use two complementary techniques. These
techniques are conceptually similar to those used by the Library
Detector Chrome extension [20] and Retire.js.
Static Detection: We compute the file hashes of all observed
JavaScript code and compare them to the 19,099 reference
hashes in our catalogue. File hashing enables us to identify all
cases where libraries are used “as-is.”
Dynamic Detection: During the crawl, we detect the
presence of libraries in the browser by fingerprinting the
JavaScript runtime environment and by relying on libraries
to identify themselves. Specifically, modern libraries typically
make themselves available to the environment by means of a
global variable that can be detected at runtime. Furthermore,
most libraries in our catalogue contain a variable or method
that returns the version of the library. As an illustration, the
following snippet of JavaScript code detects jQuery:
1 v a r j q = window . jQuery | | window . $ | | window . $ j q | |
window . $ j ;
2 i f ( j q && j q . fn ) {
3 r e t u r n j q . fn . j q u e r y | | n u l l ; / / v e r s i o n ( i f known )
4 } e l s e {
5 r e t u r n f a l s e ; / / jQuery n o t found
6 }
Line 1 extracts jQuery’s global variable, and line 3 returns the
version number if it exists in its fn.jquery attribute. Note
that in order to prevent false positives, we check for the global
variable and that the fn attribute exists. Later on, we discard all
detections with missing or syntactically invalid version strings.
While this dynamic methodology detects libraries even if the
source code has been (lightly) modified, it relies on the version
attribute to be present. Hence, we can dynamically detect only
39 out of the 72 libraries, and for some, we do not detect
(typically older) versions lacking the version string. Table I
compares the versions detected dynamically in our crawls d©
to our static reference catalogue s©. Version coverage is often
similar; dynamic outperforms static when CDNs are incomplete.
Limitations: Our two detection techniques represent a best-
effort approach to identifying JavaScript libraries in the wild.
However, there are cases where both techniques can fail. For
example, heavily modified libraries will not match our file
hashes nor will they match the dynamic signatures. Furthermore,
we rely on the correctness of our information sources, i.e., that
CDNs contain the version of a library that they claim, and that
libraries export the correct version string and do not attempt to
conceal their presence. Effectively, these limitations mean that
our measurement results should be viewed as lower bounds.
C. Data Collection
A central contribution of our work is to analyse not only
whether outdated libraries are being used, but why this may
be the case. This implies that detecting whether a library
exists in a window or frame is not enough; we must also
detect if it was loaded by another script. To model causal
inclusion relationships of resources in websites, we introduce
the theoretical concept of causality trees and implement it
in a modern browser. We integrate our two library detection
methods into this modified browser environment and use it to
collect data about the usage of JavaScript libraries on the Web.
Causality Trees: The goal of a causality tree is to represent
the causal element creation relationships that occur during
the loading and execution of a dynamic website in a modern
browser. A causality tree contains a directed edge A → B
if and only if element A causes element B to load. More
specifically, the elements we model include scripts, images
and other media content, stylesheets, and embedded HTML
documents. A relationship exists whenever an element creates
another element (e.g., a script creates an iframe) or changes an
existing element’s URL (e.g., a script changes the URL of an
iframe or redirects the main document), which is equivalent to
creating a new element with a different URL.
While the nodes in a causality tree correspond to nodes
in the website’s DOM, their structure is entirely unrelated to
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Inline ScriptAd Script
Ad Frame w/ Scripts
Fig. 2. Example causality tree.
the hierarchical DOM tree. Rather, nodes in the causality tree
are snapshots of elements in the DOM tree at specific points
in time, and may appear multiple times if the DOM elements
are repeatedly modified. For instance, if a script creates an
iframe with URL U1 and later changes the URL to U2, the
corresponding script node in the causality tree will have two
document nodes as its children, corresponding to URLs U1
and U2, but referring to the same HTML <iframe> element.
Similarly, the predecessor of a node in the causality tree is not
necessarily a predecessor of the corresponding HTML element
in the DOM tree; they may even be located in two different
HTML documents, such as when a script appends an element
to a document in a different frame.
Figure 2 shows a synthetic example of a causality tree.
The large black circle is the document root (main document),
filled circles are scripts, squares are HTML documents (e.g.,
embedded in frames or corresponding to a new main document
if there is a top-level redirect), and empty circles are other re-
sources (e.g., images). Edges denote “created by” relationships;
for example, in Figure 2 the main document included the grey
script, which in turn included the blue script. Dashed lines
around nodes denote inline scripts, while solid lines denote
scripts included from an URL. Thick outlines denote that a
resource was included from a known ad network, tracker, or
social widget (see below for more details).
The colour of nodes in Figure 2 denotes which document
they are attached to in the DOM: grey corresponds to resources
attached to the main document, while we assign one of four
colours to each further document in frames. Document squares
contain the colour of their parent location in the DOM, and
their own assigned colour. Resources created by a script in
one frame can be attached to a document in another frame, as
shown by the grey script which has a blue child in Figure 2,
i.e., the blue script is a child of the blue document in the DOM.
Figure 12 shows the causality tree of mercantil.com,
with images and other irrelevant node types omitted for clarity.
It includes three clearly visible social media widgets: Twitter,
Facebook, and LinkedIn. Note that the web developer embedded
code provided by the social networks into the main document,
which in turn initialises each widget and creates one or more
frames for their contents. We also see that the causality tree
includes multiple copies of jQuery in the main document, which
we will discuss in detail in Section IV-G.
Implementation of Causality Trees: Our definition of
causality trees is related to the concepts previously used to
analyse malicious JavaScript inclusions [1] and cookie matching
between online ad exchanges [5], but it differs in the details. Our
implementation is independent from the aforementioned works
and uses a different technological approach by building on the
Chrome Debugging Protocol [8] to minimise the necessity for
brittle browser source code modifications.
The Chrome Debugging Protocol provides programmatic
access to the browser and allows clients to attach to open win-
dows, inspect network traffic, and interact with the JavaScript
environment and the DOM tree loaded in the window. Two
prominent uses of this API are the Chrome Developer Tools (an
HTML and JavaScript front-end to the protocol) and Selenium’s
WebDriver interface to remotely control Chrome.
At a high level, we generate causality trees by observing
resource requests through the network view of the debugging
protocol. Note that this view includes resources not actually
loaded over the network, e.g., inline URL schemas such as
data: or javascript:. We disable all forms of caching
to observe even duplicate resource inclusions within the same
frame, which are otherwise handled through an in-memory
cache. For each loaded resource, the protocol allows us to
identify the frame in which the resource is located as well
as the initiating script, where applicable. Similarly, we utilise
protocol methods to be notified of script generation events and
store the source code of both inline and URL-based JavaScript.
(This includes source code from attribute-based event handlers
and string evaluation, which we both model as inline script
nodes.) We store a log of all relevant events during the crawl
and assemble the causality trees in a post-processing step.
Integration of Library Detection: Hash-based detection of
libraries is relatively straight-forward to integrate with our
crawler; we simply compute the source code hashes of all
script nodes in the causality trees and look them up in our
reference catalogue during post-processing.
Integrating dynamic library detection is more challenging—
out of the box, existing detection methods can only detect
whether a JavaScript context (window or frame) contains a
library or not, but in general this information is not sufficient
to properly label the correct script node in the causality tree.
The Chrome Debugging Protocol allows us to link a method
executed in a JavaScript context to the script that contains its
implementation; thus, once we hold a reference to a JavaScript
library object (such as jq in the example from Section III-B),
we dynamically enumerate its instance methods and use an
arbitrary one of them to identify the implementing script.
Another challenge in dynamically detecting libraries during
the crawl is that we need to inject the detection code into each
frame of a website, since each frame has its own JavaScript
scope and may contain independent library instances. This is
further complicated by the fact that modern websites are quite
dynamic and an ad frame, for instance, may quickly navigate
to a different URL, which causes any library previously loaded
in the frame to be unloaded or replaced. Lastly, we observe
that many websites include multiple copies of the same library,
including different versions of the same library (refer to our
analysis in Section IV-G for details). Typically, only one library
instance can exist in each context because the more recently
loaded instance replaces the previous global reference.
In order to be able to study these phenomena in detail and
also address the other aforementioned detection challenges, we
inject the detection code into each frame and execute it every
4 seconds. Note that it would not be feasible from a performance
point of view to execute the detection code after each script
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creation event since websites routinely contain thousands of
script nodes (see Section IV-B).
To detect cases of inclusions that we may miss due to
the four-second detection interval, we additionally execute the
dynamic detection code post hoc on all scripts found during
the crawl. This execution is done in an individual Node.js
environment with a fake DOM tree. This offline detection
step cannot fully replace in-browser detections, however, since
some libraries such as jQuery UI have code or environment
prerequisites that cause the offline detection to fail.
Annotation of Ads, Trackers and Widgets: To further clarify
the provenance of scripts we observe in our crawl, we aim
to determine whether they are related to known advertising,
tracking, or social widget code. We achieve this by injecting
a customised version of the AdBlock browser extension into
each frame. Our version of AdBlock flags content but permits
it to load, and we verified that our customised version remains
undetected by common ad-block detection scripts. We use
EasyList and EasyPrivacy to identify advertising and tracking
content, and Fanboy’s Social Blocking List to detect social
network widgets. For our analysis, we label an element in
the causality tree as ad/tracker/widget-related whenever the
corresponding element or any parent in the DOM tree is labeled
by AdBlock. Additionally, we propagate these labels downwards
to all children of the labelled node in the causality tree.
Crawl Parameters: To gain a representative view of
JavaScript library usage on the Web, we collected two different
datasets. First, we crawled the Alexa Top 75 k domains, which
represent websites popular with users. Second, we crawled
75 k domains randomly sampled from a snapshot of the .com
zone, that is, a random sample of all websites with a .com
address, which we expect to be dominated by less popular
websites. We conducted the two crawls in May 2016 from IP
addresses in a /24 range in the US. We observe ∼5 % and
∼17.2 % failure rates in ALEXA and COM, leaving us with
data from 71,217 and 62,086 unique domains, respectively.
Failures were due to timeouts and unresolvable domains, which
is expected especially for COM since the zone file contains
domains that may not have an active website.
To preserve the fidelity of our data collection, our crawler is
based on Chromium and includes support for Flash. We disable
various security mechanisms such as malware and phishing
filters. We only crawl the homepage of each visited site due
to the presence of many sites that thwart deeper traversal by
requiring log-ins. While visiting a page, the crawler scrolls
downwards to trigger loading of any dynamic content. As we
found page-loaded events to be unreliable, our crawler remains
on each page for a fixed delay of 60 seconds before clearing
its entire state, restarting, and then proceeding to the next site.
D. Validation
As the final step in our methodology, we validate that our
static and dynamic detection methods work in practice.
Dynamic Detection: To investigate the efficacy of our
dynamic detection code, we conduct a controlled experiment:
we load each of the reference libraries in our catalogue into
Node.js, one at a time, and attempt to detect each file with
the dynamic detection method. Intuitively, we know the exact
version of each loaded library, which enables us to assess the
accuracy of the dynamic detection.
Overall, we observe that the dynamic detection code is
able to identify the exact name and version of 79.2 % of the
libraries, as well as the name (but not the version) of 18.6 %
of the libraries. Only 2 % of libraries fail to be identified (i.e.,
were false negatives). We manually examine the libraries that
are only detected by name, and find that the vast majority are
older versions that do not include a variable or method that
returns the library version. Of course, 100 % of these libraries
can be detected based on their file hashes, which reinforces the
importance of using multiple techniques to identify libraries.
Static Detection: To investigate the efficacy of library
detection using file hashes, we conduct a second controlled
experiment: we randomly select from our crawled data 415
unique scripts that the dynamic detection code classifies as
being jQuery, and attempt to detect them based on their file
hashes. In this case, we are treating the output of the dynamic
detection method as ground truth.
Overall, we observe that only 15.4 % of the libraries can
be identified as jQuery based on their file hash. Although this
is a low detection rate, the result also matches our expectation
that developers often deploy customised versions of libraries.
For example, 90 % of the jQuery libraries that we fail to detect
via file hashing contain fewer than 150 line break characters,
whereas non-minified copies of jQuery from our catalogue
contain more than 1900. This strongly suggests that the unique
scripts are custom-minified versions of jQuery.
Hypothetical “Name-in-URL” Detection: For the last
validation step, we consider a simple library detection heuristic.
The heuristic flags a script file as jQuery, for instance, whenever
the string “jquery” appears in the URL of the script. To evaluate
the accuracy of this heuristic, we extract from our ALEXA crawl
the set of script URLs that contain “jquery,” and the URLs of
scripts detected as jQuery by our dynamic and static methods.
Out of these URLs, 22.3 % contain “jquery” and are also
detected as the library; 69 % are flagged only by the heuristic,
and 8.8 % are detected only by our dynamic and static methods.
The heuristic appears to cause a large number of false positives
due to scripts named “jquery” without containing the library,
and it also seems to suffer from false negatives due to scripts
that contain jQuery but have an unrelated name.
We validate this finding by manually examining 50 scripts
from each of the two set differences. The scripts in the
detection-only sample appear to contain additional code such
as application code or other libraries. Only one of these scripts
does not contain jQuery but Zepto.js, an alternative to jQuery
that is partially compatible and also defines the characteristic
$.fn variable. On the other hand, none of the scripts in the
heuristic-only sample can be confirmed as the library; nearly
all of them contain plug-ins for jQuery but not the library itself.
The results for the Modernizr library, which does not have
an equivalent to jQuery’s extensive plug-in ecosystem, confirm
this trend. The overlap between heuristic and detection is 55.3 %
of URLs, heuristic-only 0.8 %, and detection-only 44 %—the
simple heuristic misses many Modernizr files renamed by
developers. These results underline the need for more robust
detection techniques such as our dynamic and static methods;
we do not use the heuristic in our analysis.
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Fig. 3. Distribution of JavaScript inclusion type
frequency per site in ALEXA.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of library inclusion type fre-
quency per site in ALEXA.
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Fig. 5. Distribution of vulnerable library count
versus overall library count per site in ALEXA.
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frequency per site in COM.
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Fig. 7. Distribution of library inclusion type fre-
quency per site in COM.
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Fig. 8. Distribution of vulnerable library count
versus overall library count per site in COM.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyse the data from our web crawls.
First, we present a general overview of the dataset by drilling
down into the causality trees, overall JavaScript inclusion
statistics, and vulnerable JavaScript library inclusions. Next, we
examine risk factors for sites that include vulnerable libraries,
and the age of vulnerable libraries (i.e., relative to the latest
release of each library). Finally, we examine unexpected,
duplicate library inclusions in websites, and investigate whether
common remediations practices are useful and used in practice.
A. Causality Trees
We begin our analysis by measuring the complexity of the
websites in our crawls. The median causality tree in ALEXA
contains 133 nodes (p95: 425, max: 19,508) whereas it is
38 nodes (p95: 298, max: 25,485) in COM, indicating that
ALEXA contains a larger share of more complex websites.
Similarly, ALEXA and COM contain a median of 52 and
14 image nodes, 44 and 16 script nodes, and 4 and 2 document
nodes per causality tree, respectively. 95 % of frames in both
crawls show only one or two documents during the 60 s of
our crawl, whereas a few cycle through larger numbers of
documents (max: 12 for ALEXA and 32 for COM).
The median depth of the causality trees (defined as the
length of the longest path from the root to a leaf) is 4 inclusions
(p95: 9, max: 438) in ALEXA and 3 (p95: 8, max: 62) in COM.
Since paths correspond to causal relationships, intuitively this
means that the inclusion of a node could have been influenced
by up to 438 predecessors. In both crawls, images tend to
appear further up in the causality trees at a median depth of 1,
that is, at least half of them are directly included in the main
document, whereas documents tend to appear further down
at a median depth of 2, which indicates that they are more
frequently dynamically generated.
B. General JavaScript Statistics
Scripts are the most common node type in our causality
trees; 97 % of ALEXA sites and 83.6 % of COM sites contain
JavaScript. The most common script type are inline scripts,
which includes script code embedded as text in a <script>
tag, any code in attribute-based event handlers (such as the
onclick attribute), and any code evaluated from strings using
methods such as eval(). The causality trees from the ALEXA
and COM crawls contain a median of 24 and 9 inline scripts,
respectively, with 13.6 % and 6.7 % of the sites having hundreds
of inline scripts—the maximum observed was 19 K and 25 K.
When looking at URL-based script inclusions, we distin-
guish between internal scripts, that is, code hosted on the
same domain as the website (or a subdomain of the website),
and all other scripts that we call external. Figures 3 and 6
depict the distribution of script inclusion types for ALEXA and
COM, respectively. About 91.7 % of all ALEXA sites include
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TABLE II. EXTERNAL JAVASCRIPT: TOP 10 MARKET SHARE.
SORTED BY ALEXA; DATA OMITTED FOR HOSTS NOT PART OF THE TOP 10.
Hostname ALEXA COM
www.google.com 11.5%
www.google-analytics.com 9.5% 9.4%
ak2.imgaft.com 5.6%
ajax.googleapis.com 3.1% 3.9%
pagead2.googlesyndication.com 2.9% 1.5%
connect.facebook.net 2.8% 1.5%
www.googletagmanager.com 2.4%
www.googletagservices.com 2.1%
partner.googleadservices.com 2.0%
www.googleadservices.com 2.0%
platform.twitter.com 1.8% 1.2%
apis.google.com 1.5% 1.3%
maps.googleapis.com 1.3%
s.ytimg.com 1.2%
TABLE III. DETECTED JS LIBRARIES: TOP 10 MARKET SHARE.
SORTED BY ALEXA; DATA OMITTED FOR HOSTS NOT PART OF THE TOP 10.
Hostname ALEXA COM
ak2.imgaft.com 18.3%
ajax.googleapis.com 17.6% 12.7%
code.jquery.com 3.5% 3.1%
static.hugedomains.com 2.8%
static.parastorage.com 2.3%
img.sedoparking.com 1.6%
img4.wsimg.com 1.5%
cdnjs.cloudflare.com 2.1% 1.4%
static.squarespace.com 1.3%
s0.2mdn.net 1.4%
ivid-cdn.adhigh.net 1.2%
maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com 0.9%
s0.wp.com 0.9%
cdn10.trafficjunky.net 0.4%
netdna.bootstrapcdn.com 0.4%
ajax.aspnetcdn.com 0.3%
dsms0mj1bbhn4.cloudfront.net 0.3%
at least one external script, which is consistent with the 88.5 %
Nikiforakis et al. found for the Alexa Top 10 k [22]. The median
number of internal scripts is 4 per site in ALEXA (0 in COM)
and the maximum is 224 (134). Externally-hosted script appears
more prevalent with a median of 9 in ALEXA (max: 202) and
2 in COM (max: 172); 6.3 % of sites in ALEXA, and 4.8 % in
COM, include 30 or more external scripts. However, we note
that we likely underestimate the fraction of internal scripts
because our domain name-based heuristic cannot infer that two
domains may be under the same administrative control when
one is not a subdomain of the other. In both crawls, the median
inclusion depth of an internal script node is 1, i.e., directly
included by the main document, whereas the median depth of
an external script node is 2, suggesting indirect inclusions.
Each site includes scripts from a median of 5 external hosts
in ALEXA (2 in COM) with a maximum of 50 (45). Table II
lists the hostnames most frequently included by <script>
tags (counting each hostname at most once per site to reduce
bias through multiple inclusions). At least 5 of the Top 10
in ALEXA are related to advertising, especially Google’s ad
platforms. This agrees with prior work that has found Google’s
Web advertising presence to be nearly ubiquitous ([10], [7]).
C. General Library Statistics
Next, we narrow our analysis to focus just on JavaScript
libraries from our catalogue. We use the union of detections
TABLE IV. INCLUSION TYPES OF DETECTED LIBRARIES: LOADED FROM
INLINE/INTERNAL/EXTERNAL SCRIPT & INCLUSIONS (OF ANY TYPE) DUE
TO AD/TRACKER/WIDGET CODE. GREYED OUT IF <100 INCLUSIONS;
OMITTED IF <10. LIBRARIES COUNTED AT MOST ONCE PER SITE.
ALEXA COM
Included From Ad/Tr./ Included From Ad/Tr./
Library Inl. Int. Ext. Widget Inl. Int. Ext. Widget
jQuery 2.7 58.8 38.6 3.4 2.9 29.5 67.6 25.6
Modernizr 3.0 65.4 31.6 12.2 1.4 38.2 60.4 3.5
Bootstrap 1.7 69.9 28.4 0.3 0.5 49.2 50.3 3.5
SWFObject 4.4 34.2 61.4 42.4 0.8 13.7 85.5 4.5
RequireJS 2.6 46.6 50.8 8.4 3.9 95.7 6.4
Angular 2.2 56.8 41.0 3.8 5.7 94.2 5.3
LoDash 0.7 48.3 51.0 10.6 7.2 92.7 6.7
GreenSock 13.6 46.0 40.4 30.5 20.3 22.1 57.6 3.7
made by all our techniques, but exclude detections where the
version of the library is unknown. Overall, we detect at least
one of our 72 target libraries on 86.6 % of all ALEXA sites and
65.4 % of all sites in COM. Table I lists the 30 libraries that
appear on most sites in ALEXA. We also list the percentage
of sites in COM that include the same libraries; however, for
clarity we omit two libraries (both below 0.5 %) that are part
of the Top 30 in COM but not in ALEXA. jQuery is by far the
most popular library, which we find on 83.9 % of the ALEXA
sites and 61.1 % of the COM sites. SWFObject, a library used
to include Adobe Flash content, is ranked seventh (3.7 %) and
tenth (2.4 %) despite being discontinued [33] since 2013. On
the other hand, several relatively well-known libraries such as
D3, Dojo and Leaflet appear below the Top 30 in both crawls.
We also observe that the market share for these libraries is
generally consistent with the data reported by Wappalyzer.
Figures 4 and 7 show the distribution of detected libraries
with respect to their inclusion type (i.e., inline, internal, and
external) in the two crawls. We detect libraries in inline script
on 4.1 % of all ALEXA sites (and 2.8 % of COM sites), which
occurs when library code is copy-pasted into a <script> tag
directly embedded in HTML, or when a script is generated by
evaluating a string. For instance, we observe that a version of
Dojo loads additional components by making an asynchronous
request and passing the response to eval(). We detect internal
and external inclusions in 62.0 % and 41.1 % of all sites with
an overall median of two different libraries per site in ALEXA
(COM: internal libraries on 21.4 % of sites, external on 48.7 %,
with a median of one library per site).
Table III contains the most frequent hosts serving detected
JavaScript libraries. Unsurprisingly, JavaScript CDNs are well
represented (six in the Top 10 of ALEXA and three in the
Top 10 of COM); they were all used to build our catalogue
of library reference files. Between 13 % and 18 % of all non-
inline JavaScript library inclusions are loaded from Google’s
CDN. Perhaps illustrating the “long tail” nature of the COM
crawl, we observe that several web hosting and domain parking
companies are represented in the Top 10 library sources of
COM (note that we did not group subdomains; e.g., there are
multiple other subdomains of wsimg.com below the Top 10).
Table IV lists the percentage of inline, internal, and external
inclusions for a selection of detected libraries. While the
majority of inclusions in ALEXA come from internally-hosted
sources (i.e., the website’s own domain), most inclusions
are external in COM. About 7.3 % of all sites in ALEXA
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Fig. 10. Box plot of each website’s maximum lag behind the newest release
of each detected library, broken down into site categories and a random sample
of 10,000 websites (ALEXA). Governmental sites are longest behind.
(16.0 % in COM) contain at least one library inclusion that
is causally related to ad, tracker or widget code; SWFObject
and GreenSock are relatively often included by such code.
D. Vulnerable Libraries
We now move on to answering our research questions,
starting with how many websites become potentially vulnerable
due to including a library version with known vulnerabilities.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of total and vulnerable
libraries per ALEXA website. Overall, we find that 37.8 %
of sites use at least one library version that we know to be
vulnerable, and 9.7 % use two or more different vulnerable
library versions (COM in Figure 8: 37.4 % and 4.1 %).
To better understand how website popularity is correlated
with vulnerable libraries, we plot in Figure 9 the percentage
of vulnerable ALEXA websites according to their Alexa ranks.
Highly-ranked websites tend to be less likely to include
vulnerable libraries, but they are also less likely to include
any detected library at all. Towards the lower ranks, both
curves increase at a similar pace until they stabilise. While
only 21 % of the Top 100 websites use a known vulnerable
library, this percentage increases to 32.2 % in the Top 1 k
before it stabilises in the Top 5 k and remains around the
overall average of 37.8 % for all 75 k websites. This indicates
that even relatively large websites (albeit not the largest ones)
have a vulnerability rate comparable to the average of the COM
dataset, which is dominated by smaller sites.
When grouping ALEXA according to the McAfee Smart-
Filter web categorisation [19], we find that financial and
governmental websites rank last with 52 % and 50 % vulnerable
sites, respectively. Malicious websites (e.g., spam) have the
same proportion as the full dataset, while parked and adult
sites are the least vulnerable with 24 % and 19 %, respectively.
Table V shows the percentage of vulnerable copies for 5 out
of the 11 JavaScript libraries in our catalogue with vulnerability
data. In ALEXA, 36.7 % of jQuery inclusions are known
vulnerable, when at most one inclusion of a specific library
version is counted per site. Angular has 40.1 % vulnerable
inclusions, Handlebars has 86.6 %, and YUI 3 has 87.3 % (it
is not maintained any more). These numbers illustrate that
inclusions of known vulnerable versions can make up even a
majority of all inclusions of a library. However, we caution
that these numbers are not suitable for comparing the relative
vulnerabilities of different libraries (see Section III-A5).
E. Risk Factors for Vulnerability
So far, we have examined whether sites are potentially
vulnerable, that is, whether they include one or more known
vulnerable libraries. In the following, we turn to how libraries
are included by sites and whether we can identify any factors
indicating a higher fraction of vulnerable inclusions.
When we look at how the library is being hosted, inline
inclusions of jQuery have a clearly higher fraction of vulnerable
versions than internally or externally hosted copies. The
situation is similar when focusing on the parent node of a
library, that is, the document or script that caused the library
to be included. For most libraries, direct inclusions by the
main document are less likely to be vulnerable than indirect
inclusions such as through an intermediate script or in a frame.
As an example for web applications, we briefly survey
library use related to WordPress. We consider a library to be
used by WordPress if the URL of either the library or its
next parent in the causality tree contains /wp-content/;
an inclusion is unrelated if neither condition holds. For all
libraries, WordPress-related inclusions appear to be slightly
more up-to-date than unrelated inclusions.
On the other hand, library inclusions by ad, widget or tracker
code appear to be more vulnerable than unrelated inclusions.
While the difference is relatively small for jQuery in ALEXA,
the vulnerability rate of jQuery associated with ad, widget
or tracker code in COM—89 %—is almost double the rate of
unrelated inclusions. We speculate that this may be due to the
use of less reputable ad networks or widgets on the smaller
sites in COM as opposed to the larger sites in ALEXA.
We note that the factors above are relatively coarse and
the effects are sometimes opposite for different libraries. We
suggest further investigation into the underlying causes.
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TABLE V. VULNERABLE FRACTION OF INCLUSIONS PER LIBRARY, COUNTING AT MOST ONE LIBRARY-VERSION PAIR PER SITE. CONFIGURATIONS WITH
LESS THAN 100 VULNERABLE INCLUSIONS GRAYED OUT; OMITTED IF LESS THAN 10 TOTAL INCLUSIONS AFTER FILTER.
(a) ALEXA
Inclusion Filter jQuery jQ-UI Angular Handlebars YUI 3
All Inclusions 36.7 % 33.7 % 40.1 % 86.6 % 87.3 %
Internal 38.1 % 33.0 % 37.1 % 84.6 % 92.8 %
External 34.8 % 35.5 % 48.2 % 88.6 % 83.8 %
Inline 54.8 % 30.7 % 20.0 % 100.0 % -
Internal Parent 37.1 % 33.7 % 40.6 % 85.3 % 91.3 %
External Parent 32.6 % 33.8 % 41.8 % 96.4 % 92.2 %
Inline Parent 47.6 % 35.2 % 25.6 % 83.7 % 79.6 %
Direct Incl. in Root 36.4 % 33.5 % 40.1 % 85.2 % 90.4 %
Indirect Inclusion 41.0 % 35.6 % 43.2 % 92.3 % 87.1 %
WordPress 29.2 % 14.4 % 23.5 % 77.3 % -
Non-WordPress 36.8 % 34.2 % 40.7 % 86.8 % 87.3 %
Ad/Widget/Tracker 38.1 % 39.8 % 23.5 % 96.9 % 98.2 %
No Ad/Widget/Tracker 36.7 % 33.6 % 40.8 % 86.5 % 84.1 %
(b) COM
Inclusion Filter jQuery jQ-UI Angular Handlebars YUI 3
All Inclusions 55.4 % 37.3 % 38.7 % 87.5 % 13.7 %
Internal 41.6 % 28.1 % 45.8 % 100.0 % 68.8 %
External 62.7 % 42.7 % 38.4 % 85.4 % 12.6 %
Inline 89.9 % 25.6 % - - -
Internal Parent 59.7 % 37.0 % 78.2 % 94.2 % 47.9 %
External Parent 45.9 % 38.0 % 20.7 % 84.1 % 68.9 %
Inline Parent 79.8 % 48.9 % - - 1.0 %
Direct Incl. in Root 42.6 % 36.2 % 41.3 % 88.7 % 50.4 %
Indirect Inclusion 77.5 % 44.5 % 30.8 % 86.4 % 7.5 %
WordPress 41.6 % 20.4 % 25.0 % 70.3 % -
Non-WordPress 55.6 % 38.6 % 38.9 % 90.7 % 13.7 %
Ad/Widget/Tracker 89.0 % 31.6 % 19.2 % - 55.0 %
No Ad/Widget/Tracker 45.5 % 37.3 % 39.6 % 87.3 % 12.7 %
TABLE VI. DAYS BETWEEN RELEASE OF USED VERSION AND NEWEST
AVAILABLE LIBRARY VERSION (MEDIAN OVER INCLUSIONS). SHOWN
SEPARATELY FOR VULNERABLE AND NON-VULNERABLE INCLUSIONS
WHERE AVAILABLE, OR (CENTRED) FOR ALL INCLUSIONS OTHERWISE.
GREYED OUT WHEN LESS THAN 100 INCLUSIONS OBSERVED.
ALEXA COM
Library Vuln. Non-V. Vuln. Non-V.
jQuery 1476 705 2243 705
jQuery-Migrate 1105 1024 1105 1024
jQuery-Mobile 49 122
Bootstrap 304 389
Angular 657 234 489 287
Handlebars 687 0 687 57
Prototype 1772 1772
MooTools 1417 1417
YUI 3 393 140 393 140
Raphael 1491 1491
D3 491 139
F. Relative Age of Libraries
When websites include outdated libraries, an interesting
question is how far they are behind more current versions of the
libraries. We begin by looking at how far sites are behind the
most recent patch-level releases of libraries. Patch-level releases
are usually (though not always) backwards-compatible. In
ALEXA, we observe that non-vulnerable inclusions of Angular
lag behind by a median of five versions, whereas the median
is seven versions for vulnerable inclusions.
When looking at the number of days between the release
date of the included version and the release date of the newest
available library version overall, the lag for Angular is 398 days
for all inclusions, 657 days for vulnerable inclusions, and
234 days for non-vulnerable inclusions. While this may suggest
that there is a relationship between higher lag and vulnerability
of a site, we note that the lag is also tied to the availability of
newer versions—if no update is available, the lag is zero yet
the used version could be vulnerable. For instance, 6.7 % of
all (16.6 % of vulnerable) Angular inclusions in ALEXA use
the latest available release in their respective patch branch, but
remain vulnerable as the branch contains no fixed version.
With this caveat in mind, Table VI shows the median lag (in
days) behind the most recently released version of each library.
We observe significant variations. For instance, the median D3
inclusion in ALEXA uses a version 491 days older than the
newest D3 release. For Mootools, the lag is 1,417 days.
To characterise lag from a per-site point of view, we
calculate the maximum lag of all inclusions on each site and find
that 61.4 % of ALEXA sites are at least one patch version behind
on one of their included libraries (COM: 46.2 %). Similarly, the
median ALEXA site uses a version released 1,177 days (COM:
1,476 days) before the newest available release of the library.
Finally, we plot this lag according to the category of ALEXA
sites in Figure 10. Each candlestick shows the 5th, 25th, 50th,
75th, and 95th percentiles, respectively. We observe that both
governmental and financial websites are the longest behind
current releases with a median lag of 1,293 and 1,239 days,
respectively. Similar to per-category vulnerability rates, parked
and adult websites exhibit values better than the average.
In summary, these results demonstrate that the majority of
web developers are working with library versions released a
long time ago. We observe median lags measured in years,
suggesting that web developers rarely update their library
dependencies once they have deployed a site.
G. Duplicate Inclusions
While analysing the use of JavaScript libraries on websites,
we noticed that libraries are often used in unexpected ways.
We discuss some examples using jQuery as a case study. About
20.7 % of the websites including jQuery in ALEXA (17.2 % in
COM) do so two or more times. While it may be necessary to
include a library multiple times within different documents from
different origins, 4.2 % of websites using jQuery in ALEXA
include the same version of the library two or more times
into the same document (5.1 % in COM), and 10.9 % (5.7 %)
include two or more different versions of jQuery into the
same document. Since jQuery registers itself as a window-
global variable, unless special steps are taken only the last
loaded and executed instance can be used by client code. For
asynchronously included instances, it may even be difficult to
predict which version will prevail in the end.
Figure 11 shows the causality tree of ms.gov, the site with
the highest number of identical jQuery inclusions in a single
document. Only one instance (version 2.2.2) is included
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Fig. 11. Causality tree for ms.gov, showing multiple jQuery inclusions in
a single document. One instance is referenced in the main HTML page; all
others are included transitively by other scripts.
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Fig. 12. Causality tree for mercantil.com with multiple jQuery inclusions,
two libraries concatenated into one file (Modernizr and Yepnope), and complex
element relationships in social media widgets (Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn).
directly in the source code of the main HTML page; all twelve
other jQuery inclusions (of version 2.2.0) are injected by
various self-hosted scripts in quick succession.
In contrast, the inclusions of four different jQuery versions
on mercantil.com (Figure 12) are all referenced directly in
the main page’s source code, some of them directly adjacent to
each other. While we can only speculate why these cases occur,
at least some of them may be related to server-side templating,
or the combination of independently developed components
into a single document. Indeed, we have observed cases where
a web application (e.g., a WordPress plug-in) that bundled
its own version of a library was integrated into a page that
already contained a separate copy of the same library. Since
duplicate inclusions of a library do not necessarily break any
functionality, we suspect that many web developers may not
be aware that they include a library multiple times, and even
less that the duplicate inclusion may be potentially vulnerable.
H. Remediations
From a remediation perspective, the picture painted by
our data is bleak. We observe that only very small fraction
of potentially vulnerable sites (2.8 % in ALEXA, 1.6 % in
COM) could become free of vulnerabilities by applying patch-
level updates, i.e., an update of the least significant version
component, such as from 1.2.3 to 1.2.4, which would
generally be expected to be backwards compatible. The vast
majority of sites would need to install at least one library
with a more recent major or minor version, which might
necessitate additional code changes due to incompatibilities.
Version Aliasing. Some JavaScript CDNs support version
aliasing, where the developer may specify only a prefix of
the requested library version and the CDN will automatically
return the latest available version with that prefix. In theory,
version aliasing appears to be a robust strategy for developers
to easily keep their library dependencies up-to-date. We scan
our crawl for library inclusions with URLs of a CDN, and
detect version aliasing whenever (1) the version given in the
URL has only one or two components, such as 1.2, and (2)
the library version detected by the static or dynamic method
is greater than the prefix extended with zeros, such as 1.2.3
instead of 1.2.0. In ALEXA (and COM), we detect 1,489
(914) confirmed instances of version aliasing, counting at most
one per library on each site. Overall, however, the frequency of
version aliasing is very small—only around 1.2 % of all sites
that include jQuery use version aliasing.
Except for one, all instances of aliasing refer to Google’s
CDN, with jQuery being the most frequent library. One one
hand, 47.2 % (37.9 %) of jQuery inclusions with aliasing are
avoiding a vulnerability, i.e., the inclusions point to a branch
that has a known vulnerability, but the issue is addressed by the
latest version. On the other hand, while version aliasing may
seem like a good way to automatically avoid vulnerabilities,
Google recently discontinued this service, citing caching issues
and “lack of compatibility between even minor versions” [11].
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V. DISCUSSION
Our research has shown that even though patches may be
available, vulnerable JavaScript libraries are in widespread use
on the Web. In the following, we discuss approaches that we
believe could improve the situation.
Dependency Management: Before website developers can
update potentially vulnerable libraries that they are using, they
must be aware of which libraries they are using. Instead of
manually copying library files or CDN links into their codebase,
developers should consider more systematic approaches to
dependency management. Bower [6] and the more server-
oriented Node Package Manager [23] allow developers to
declare external dependencies in a configuration file and can
automatically download and include the code into the project.
Tools such as Auditjs [2] (for Node projects) scan dependencies
for known vulnerabilities and can be integrated into automated
build processes; such solutions, however, work only if the
developer has an understanding of the risks associated with
using vulnerable libraries, and is aware of the audit tool itself.
Therefore, this functionality would ideally be integrated into the
dependency management system of the programming platform
so that a warning can be shown each time a developer includes
a known vulnerable component from the central repository.
Code Maintenance: Effective strategies to have web devel-
opers update vulnerable libraries work only when vulnerability
information is properly tracked and disseminated. Unfortunately,
security does not appear to be a priority in the JavaScript library
ecosystem. Popular vulnerability databases contain nearly no
entries regarding JavaScript libraries. None of the 12 most
popular libraries from Table I had a dedicated mailing list for
security announcements. Furthermore, only a few JavaScript
library developers provide a dedicated email address where
users can submit vulnerability reports. When the release notes
of libraries mention at all that a vulnerability has been fixed,
they often do not provide any details about the affected code, or
which prior versions are vulnerable. This is problematic because
web developers using that library do not know whether the
vulnerable code is a function that they depend on, and whether
an update is required. Libraries can even silently reintroduce
vulnerabilities in order to remain backwards-compatible [12].
Although jQuery is an immensely popular library, the fact
that searching for “security” or “vulnerability” in the official
learning centre returns “Apologies, but nothing matched your
search criteria” is an excellent summary of the state of
JavaScript library security on the Internet, circa August 2016.1
A similar lack of adequate information about security issues
has also been reported for the Android library ecosystem [3].
An additional complication is that patches are often supplied
only for the most recent versions of a library. Yet, these
versions are not necessarily backwards-compatible with the
versions still in use by many web developers. In fact, the short
lifecycles common in web development can become a burden
for developers who need to keep up with frequent breaking API
changes to maintain their websites free of vulnerable libraries.
Third-Party Components: We observed that libraries in-
cluded by third-party components such as advertising, tracking
1Ember, the 50th most popular library in ALEXA (rank 52 in COM), is
a notable exception with long-term support versions, a security mailing list,
CVEs for vulnerabilities, and affected versions listed in security notices.
or social media widget code have a higher rate of vulnerability
than other inclusions. Such components are often hosted on
third-party servers and loaded dynamically through client-
side JavaScript. Additional libraries loaded at runtime by
these components do not appear in the website’s codebase,
and web developers may be unaware that they are indirectly
including vulnerable code into their website. Similarly, dynamic
inclusions of libraries by third-party components may explain
some of the same-document duplicate inclusions that we noticed.
In addition to keeping their library dependencies up to date,
developers of web services meant to be included into other
websites could avoid replacing an existing library instance
by using a methodology similar to ours to test whether the
library has already been loaded into the page before adding
their own copy. On the other hand, web developers who intend
to use third-party components such as advertising code for their
website can attempt to limit potential damage by isolating these
components in separate frames whenever this is feasible.
VI. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to prior studies on JavaScript security,
measurements of vulnerability patching and dependency man-
agement, a series of blog posts about inclusions of vulnerable
libraries that inspired our more in-depth analysis, and existing
tools that implement a subset of our detection methodology.
JavaScript Security: In [22], Nikiforakis et al. identify
the network sources of JavaScript inclusions in the Alexa
Top 10 k websites, without special consideration for libraries
or corresponding versioning semantics, and develop host-based
metrics for maintenance quality to assess whether remote code
providers could be compromised by attackers and subsequently
serve malicious JavaScript. Whereas Nikiforakis et al. study
where included code is hosted, we focus on the narrower but
semantically richer setting of libraries to investigate whether
included code is outdated or known to be vulnerable, and we
leverage our deep browser instrumentation to determine the
initiators and causes of such inclusions.
A separate class of related work examines specific at-
tack vectors in client-side JavaScript and conducts crawls
to estimate how many websites are subject to the attack:
Lekies and Johns [16] survey insecure usage of JavaScript’s
localStorage() function for code caching purposes, Son
and Shmatikov [31] examine vulnerabilities arising from
unsafe uses of the postMessage() function, Lekies et
al. [17] detect and validate DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities,
and Richards et al. [29] analyse websites’ usage patterns
of the problematic eval() API. Yue and Wang [39] study
several insecure practices related to JavaScript, namely cross-
domain inclusion of scripts as well as the execution and
rendering of dynamically generated JavaScript and HTML
through eval() and document.write(), respectively. Li
et al. [18] detect malicious redirection code hidden in JavaScript
files on compromised hosts by deriving signatures from the
differences between infected library files and the original,
benign copies. In contrast to the above work, we do not focus
on specific vulnerabilities, the use of security-critical functions,
or malicious files. Instead, we provide empirical results at a
more abstract level to highlight and explain the prevalence of
benign-but-vulnerable JavaScript libraries in the wild.
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Vulnerability and Dependency Management: Four stud-
ies have examined vulnerability patching and dependency
management in large software ecosystems, although not with
respect to JavaScript or the Web. Sonatype Inc., the company
behind Maven, released a report [32] examining security
maintenance practices observed from the vantage point of
the largest repository of Java components. According to the
report, the mean time-to-repair of a security vulnerability in
component dependencies is 390 days, 51,000 of the components
in the repository have known security concerns, and 6.2 % of
downloaded components include known vulnerabilities. A key
observation in the report is that fixing serious flaws in open
source code does not stop vulnerable versions from being used.
Our work in this paper shows that there are similar trends with
respect to JavaScript library usage on the Web.
Nappa et al. analyse the patch deployment process for
1,593 vulnerabilities in 10 applications installed on 8.4 million
Windows hosts worldwide [21]. The authors show that the time
until a patch is released for different applications affected by
the same vulnerability in a shared library can differ by up to
118 days, with a median of 11 days. Furthermore, patching
rates vary among applications and depend, among other factors,
on the update mechanism. At most 14 % of vulnerable hosts
are patched before an exploit is released.
Thomas et al. propose an exponential decay model to
estimate patching delays of Android devices [35]. According
to the model, when a new version of the operating system is
released, it takes 3.4 years to reach 95 % of the devices.
Backes et al. build LIBSCOUT [3], a system to detect
third-party library code in Android applications using a static
approach based on abstracted package trees and method
signatures. They find that 70.4 % of library inclusions in their
dataset include an outdated version, and it takes developers
an average of almost one year to migrate their applications to
a newer library version after the library has been updated. In
a case study of two vulnerabilities, the authors show that the
average update delay is 59 and 188 days after the library patch is
first made available, while some applications remain without any
update. Furthermore, 10 out of 39 advertising libraries contain
one or more versions that improperly use cryptographic APIs.
In contrast to LIBSCOUT, our detection approach requires that
the library API methods used in our signatures not be renamed
or removed. While a theoretical possibility, we believe that such
eager minification settings are exceedingly rare on the Web
since they would necessitate processing all code potentially
referencing the library, including in HTML attributes and inline
script. To the best of our knowledge, the default settings of
minifiers typically do not rename methods or remove dead
code in client-side JavaScript (see, for instance, the Closure
Compiler [9]). This assumption allows us to detect the version
of a JavaScript library more reliably since most libraries self-
identify via their version attribute or method.
Blog Posts: In 2014, a series of blog posts by Oftedal ([24],
[25], [26]) raised awareness about the use of outdated JavaScript
libraries on the Web, and the fact that many large companies
(including banks) use versions that are known to be vulnerable.
We complement this first exploration of the issue with a more
comprehensive detection methodology and a more detailed
analysis. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to report
on the modality and causes of JavaScript library inclusions in
websites, uncovering issues such as duplicate library inclusions
as well as transitive (and on average more vulnerable) inclusions
of libraries by third-party modules such as advertising, tracking,
and social media widget code.
Tools: From the point of view of our library detection
methodology, we are aware of two open source tools with a
similar approach: Retire.js and the Library Detector extension.
Library Detector Chrome Extension. This browser exten-
sion [20] aims to detect the JavaScript libraries running on a
website. It injects a script into the website’s main document
to test for the presence of known libraries and extracts their
version, using dynamic detection code similar to the approach
presented in Section III-B. The extension does not warn against
known vulnerabilities, does not reveal how or why a library
was included, cannot reliably detect duplicate inclusions, and
does not analyse libraries loaded in frames.
Retire.js. Along with his blog posts, Oftedal released a tool [27]
to help web developers detect JavaScript libraries with known
vulnerabilities. In a nutshell, Retire.js is a browser extension
that intercepts network requests for JavaScript files while
a website is loading and detects libraries based on known
file hashes, regular expressions over the file contents, and
API method signatures dynamically evaluated in an empty
sandbox environment. While we also use dynamic detection
and hash detection approaches in our methodology, Retire.js
makes several simplifications that limit the tool’s utility for
our analysis. First, detecting a script as a library in an empty
sandbox fails when the library has unmet dependencies. jQuery-
UI, for instance, requires jQuery and hence cannot be detected
dynamically if jQuery is not present in the environment. Second,
intercepting requests only at the network level may miss inline
scripts, dynamically evaluated scripts, and duplicate inclusions
of cached scripts. Most importantly, Retire.js does not reveal
why a library was included, that is, whether the inclusion was
caused by advertising code, for instance. We support all of
these scenarios and found interesting results as a consequence,
such as the vulnerability rates per inclusion type in Table V,
and the duplicate inclusions observed in Section IV-G.
VII. CONCLUSION
Third-party JavaScript libraries such as Angular, Bootstrap
and jQuery are are frequently used on websites today. While
such libraries allow web developers to create highly interactive,
visually appealing websites, vulnerabilities in these libraries
might increase the attack surface of the websites that depend
on them. Hence, it is very important to ensure that only recent,
patched versions of these libraries are being utilised.
In this paper, we presented the first comprehensive study on
the security implications surrounding JavaScript library usage
on real-world websites. We found that:
• 86.6 % of ALEXA Top 75 k websites and 65.4 % of
COM websites use at least one of the 72 JavaScript
libraries in our catalogue (Section IV-C);
• more than 37 % of websites use at least one library
version with a known vulnerability, and vulnerable
inclusions can account for a significant portion of all
observed inclusions of a library (Section IV-D);
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• the median lag between the oldest library version used
on each website and the newest available version of
that library is 1,177 days in ALEXA and 1,476 days
in COM (Section IV-F), and development of some
libraries still in active use ceased years ago;
• surprisingly often, libraries are not referenced directly
in a page, but also inlined, or included transitively by
other content such as advertising, tracking or social
media widget code (Table IV), and those inclusions
have a higher rate of vulnerability than other, direct
inclusions (Table V, Section IV-E);
• composition of content modules or third-party content
in the same document can lead to duplicate inclusions
of a library and potentially nondeterministic behaviour
with respect to vulnerability (Section IV-G);
• remediation efforts are hindered by a lack of backwards-
compatible patches (Section IV-H) and, more generally,
scant availability of information (Section V).
The results of this work highlight the need for more
thorough and systematic approaches to JavaScript library
inclusion and dependency management on the Web.
The causality trees shown in this work can be viewed online:
https:// seclab.ccs.neu.edu/static/projects/ javascript-libraries/
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